The Confronting Prejudiced Responses (CPR) Model: Applying CPR in Organizations

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Despite increased diversity efforts, stigmatized targets report frequent experiences with discrimination, particularly in its subtle, everyday forms. We argue that confrontation provides targets and nontargets a way to communicate dissatisfaction with discriminatory treatment, thereby promoting an inclusive climate. We review the Confronting Prejudiced Responses (CPR) Model (S. A. Goodwin, L. Ashburn-Nardo, & K. A. Morris, 2007, 2008), applying its principles to organizational contexts, and we offer practical suggestions for educating people about the roadblocks to confrontation and strategies for overcoming them.

Since the Civil Rights Movement and the implementation of affirmative action laws, organizations in the United States have paid increasing attention to diversity issues. A recent review indicates that the majority of U.S. employers utilize some form of diversity training (Paluck, 2006). Although this trend is encouraging, the publication of this special issue suggests that researchers and practitioners alike have much to learn about effectively educating members of organizations about ways to create and maintain a culturally inclusive climate.

The primary goal of diversity training is to remove obstacles faced by members of organizations that might prevent their professional and personal growth (Noe & Ford, 1992). For stigmatized targets, one major obstacle is dealing with “everyday prejudice” (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003); “micro-inequities” (Haslett & Lipman, 1997); or “microaggressions” (Sue et al., 2007). These experiences include subtle forms of discriminatory treatment, such as being the target of staring or insensitive jokes, being avoided by majority group members, or being referred to in derogatory or stereotypic terms. College students (Swim et al., 2001, 2003) and members of the workforce (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000) report frequent experiences with these daily hassles, and they report feeling angry and uncomfortable as a result (Swim et al., 2001, 2003). Furthermore, these experiences make targets feel like they do not belong (Solorzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000), and, to the extent that they feel socially isolated, their performance suffers (Walton & Cohen, 2007).

One danger of everyday prejudice is that it often goes unrecognized by members of groups that are not historically targets of discrimination (see Sue et al., 2007). Consequently, nontargets may be less able to regulate their own expressions of everyday prejudice, thereby making it difficult to enforce the advocated (e.g., Hemphill & Haines, 1997)—but often unsuccessful (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006)—zero-tolerance policies that organizations sometimes implement in an attempt to eliminate discrimination. Additionally, because nontargets often fail to detect everyday prejudice, they may be less likely to validate targets’ perceptions of such behavior as discrimination. Perhaps this helps ex-
plain why targets often do not file formal complaints with organizations and why, when they do, they often do not pursue litigation (Nielsen & Nelson, 2005).

Indeed, there are likely many reasons why targets and nontargets are reluctant to speak out about discrimination. We describe some hurdles that people face when deciding whether to confront others’ prejudiced responses, and we offer practical recommendations for including confrontation in diversity education, both in the workplace and in the classroom. We argue that under many circumstances confrontation provides both targets and nontargets a way to communicate that discrimination is not acceptable, thereby promoting an inclusive climate in their organization.

CONFRONTATION: A COUNTERINTUITIVE RECOMMENDATION?

Encouraging confrontation may seem like a counterintuitive recommendation, given its often negative connotation. As used everyday, the word confrontation is synonymous with affectively charged, hostility-invoking terms such as argument, altercation, and conflict. However, social psychologists define prejudice confrontation as "verbally or nonverbally expressing one’s dissatisfaction with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person who is responsible for the remark or behavior" (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006: 67). Thus, confrontations are not necessarily heated interactions; they can include less pugnacious expressions of disapproval such as shaking one’s head in response to an offensive joke or asking a colleague to try to treat others fairly. In addition, people may have different goals for confronting, from changing perpetrators’ behavior to standing up for values they hold dear (Hyers, 2007). Thus, even if less direct forms of confrontation go unnoticed or are ignored by perpetrators, they can nonetheless empower confronters (Swim & Thomas, 2006).

Whether subtle or more directly challenging, confrontation makes perpetrators aware of their own biases, and it effectively reduces their prejudiced responses. For example, in a series of laboratory studies, Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) induced White participants to respond in ways that could be construed as racially biased. Participants were subsequently confronted (or not) by a confederate whom they believed was another research participant communicating by way of an Internet chat room. Participants who were confronted reported greater negative self-directed affect, guilt, and discomfort—affective consequences that are critical to the successful self-regulation of prejudice (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). Confrontations were also effective in changing participants’ behaviors and attitudes such that in a subsequent and purportedly different set of tasks, confronted participants were less likely to provide stereotypic responses than participants who were not confronted or who received a confrontation unrelated to bias, and they exhibited less prejudiced attitudes on a standard prejudice questionnaire. Clearly, confrontation can be quite effective as a prejudice reduction tool, but how can people learn to confront discrimination successfully without incurring great costs (e.g., being disliked, Czopp et al., 2006; or labeled a complainer, Kaiser & Miller, 2001)?

CONFRONTING PREJUDICED RESPONSES (CPR): A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING WHETHER AND WHEN PEOPLE CONFRONT DISCRIMINATION

Recently we proposed a model for understanding factors that predict the likelihood that people will confront discrimination that they experience or observe (Goodwin, Ashburn-Nardo, & Morris, 2007, 2008). Drawing from classic social–psychological research on bystander intervention (Latane & Darley, 1970), we argue that people face at least five hurdles in confronting discrimination (for a related perspective regarding sexual harassment, see Bowers-Sperry & O'Leary-Kelly, 2005): interpreting the incident as discrimination, deciding whether it is egregious enough to warrant confrontation (i.e., deciding that it is an emergency), taking responsibility for confronting, deciding how to confront, and finally, taking action (see Figure 1). To illustrate, imagine a male manager suggesting to a female colleague that she bake cookies for their next meeting because “women are good at that sort of thing.” Observers (including the target herself) might initially struggle to identify the comment as biased (e.g., Did he just make a sexist remark?), and if so, whether it causes harm or threatens the target’s integrity (e.g., Did he intend to be so condescending?). If they conclude that it does, then they may look to other observers to respond (e.g., Is someone going to say something?) or they may take responsibility themselves. If they assume personal responsibility, they may be unsure how to confront (e.g., Is there anything I could say to make him understand that his comment was inappropriate?). Finally, if they choose a way to confront, they may not actually do so because they fear damaging their relationship with the perpetrator or with others who may see them as overly
Although we use the "step" terminology associated with the bystander intervention model, it is important to note that observers of discrimination need not be locked into this particular sequence of obstacles and decisions. They may waiver between steps or skip steps entirely. The latter may be especially likely to occur in affectively charged situations that prompt less consciously controlled responding. For example, observers who are angered by discrimination should be more likely to respond automatically, failing to perceive the risks (see Lerner & Keilner, 2001) that are often carefully considered before confronting (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004). This is because anger is an emotion associated with high certainty and perceived situational control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and such emotions elicit more heuristic than systematic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). We therefore emphasize that the CPR Model is not a purely cognitive, consciously controlled decision tree; rather, the steps are a familiar heuristic for understanding the multiple hurdles between the occurrence of discrimination and its confrontation.

**Step 1: Detecting Discrimination**

One might think that identifying discrimination and labeling it as such is an easy task, but evidence suggests that it is not. Members of high-status groups, who often have little experience as targets of discrimination, seem especially challenged in recognizing more subtle forms of bias. For example, Czopp and Monteith (2006) found that many Whites openly endorse stereotypes that, on the surface, seem complimentary toward Blacks yet proscribe their roles in society (e.g., Blacks are athletic, so they should not be encouraged to work hard in school). In addition, even people who consciously and sincerely endorse egalitarian ideals are often unaware that they may hold biases that can be automatically activated and thus can unintentionally influence their own judgments of others (e.g., Devine, 1989; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). They sometimes misattribute their own prejudiced responses to bias-irrelevant factors because they do not see themselves as likely to violate their personal egalitarian standards (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Unfortunately, such misattribution precludes self-regulatory functions (e.g., feeling guilty and self-critical) that would help them avoid expressing prejudice or engaging in discriminatory behavior in the future (Monteith et al., 2002).

Perhaps more of a surprise is that stigmatized targets sometimes have difficulty detecting discrimination. Targets vary in the extent to which they are chronically aware of their devalued status (e.g., Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002; Pinel, 1999); while some are hyper-vigilant (Feldman Barrett & Swim, 1998)—perhaps detecting discrimination where none exists—many are low in stigma sensitivity. We refer interested readers to a more thorough review of situational and individual difference variables that predict targets' sensitivity to discrimination by Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002).

**Step 2: Deeming the Discriminatory Incident an "Emergency"**

Even if people label an incident as discrimination, they may not think that it is harmful enough to warrant intervention. In other words, they may not consider it an emergency. Latané and Darley (1970) defined emergencies as situations that involve harm (or threat of harm), are unusual and unforeseen, and require immediate action. Indeed, discrimination is physically and psychologically harmful (e.g., Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999); often takes people by surprise (e.g., Feagin, 1991); and may require an immediate response for maximally effective extinguishing (see Azrin, 1956). We use the term emergency to suggest the tipping point at which observers perceive sufficient harm, injustice, or malevolent intent to call for a response.

Observers may not interpret discriminatory incidents as emergencies for a variety of reasons. For example, when victims fail to protest discrimination, observers should infer less harm and perceive less urgency, as do bystanders in physical emergencies when victims do not signal the need for help (Fehr, 1979). In addition, if observers perceive that the discriminatory behavior was unintentional or beyond the perpetrator’s control (e.g., due to stress or fatigue), they may discount its severity (Critchlow, 1985). Finally, if the victim and perpetrator have an established relationship, then observers may be less inclined to interpret the perpetrator’s biased actions as an emergency (see Shotland & Straw, 1976).

**Step 3: Taking Responsibility to Confront Discrimination**

Another hurdle that observers face involves perceiving themselves as responsible for saying or doing something. As with physical emergencies (Darley & Latané, 1968), the number of bystanders who observe a given incident in part determines...
individuals' perceptions of responsibility. For example, Swim and Hyers (1999) found that women who witnessed a man make a sexist comment were more likely to confront him about the comment when they were the only woman present than when other women were present. It is interesting to note that this effect held only for the male's initial remark. With subsequent sexist comments, whether women were solo or among other women made little difference. Nontarget group members may not feel that it is their responsibility to confront discrimination when a target is present (see Crosby, Monin, & Richardson, 2008). Similarly, observers who are not in positions of authority may not feel personally responsible when they witness a discriminatory incident. They may instead look to those whose roles imply accountability, just as people look to authorities in physical emergencies (Milgram, 1963).

Step 4: Deciding How to Confront Discrimination Even if they take responsibility, people may sometimes be reluctant to confront discrimination because they simply do not know how. Indeed, when faced with the prospect of any difficult conversation, people often hem and haw over selecting the most appropriate response—one that will convey their message without escalating conflict (Patterson, Grenny, McMillan, & Switzler, 2002; Stone, Patton, & Heen, 1999). To illustrate, in one set of studies, the majority of female participants thought that they would directly confront a job interviewer who asked questions such as "Do you think it is important for women to wear bras to work," but when women were actually placed in such a situation, most did not confront the perpetrator directly (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Women's inability to forecast their responses accurately may suggest inexperience with confrontation or difficulty deciding upon an appropriate response in the heart of the moment. Inexperience may especially contribute to nontargets' hesitancy to confront. Whites, for example, are less likely than Blacks to report teaching their children about discrimination and how to respond when it happens (Hughes et al., 2006; Lesane-Brown, 2006). Thus, Whites may have fewer confrontation tools at their disposal than African Americans.

Step 5: Taking Action to Confront Discrimination The final hurdle that observers of discrimination face is the decision to take action and confront the perpetrator (Step 5). At this step, observers may choose not to confront because they perceive the costs of confronting as outweighing the benefits. For example, people do not like being labeled "racist" or "sexist" (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp et al., 2006), and observers may wish to avoid potential interpersonal conflict (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Indeed, people dislike targets who claim discrimination; even when those claims are clearly valid, they label them "whiners" and "complainers" (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). Such interpersonal concerns may be exacerbated in organizations, particularly when perpetrators and observers differ in status. For example, an observer may see confronting a boss as a career-ending move, even if the situation unmistakably warrants confrontation.

In addition to perceived costs of confronting, people may believe that there is little that anyone can do to combat discrimination. For example, Hodson and Esses (2005) found that many people believe that racism is due to personality (e.g., closed-mindedness) and upbringing (e.g., ignorance)—factors that are often seen as immutable (Dweck, 1996). They may therefore have low perceptions of personal or collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000) in their efforts to effect change in others and consequently be unlikely to confront.

PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DIVERSITY EDUCATION
We have presented an overview of the CPR Model and some of the factors that are likely to inhibit confrontation at each step. By recognizing the obstacles that people must overcome along the way to confronting discrimination, diversity educators (i.e., diversity trainers in organizations as well as teachers in educational settings) can better prepare people for what to do when they witness or experience bias in organizations. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that students who learned about the bystander intervention model in their psychology courses increased their prosocial behaviors in physical emergencies (Garmon, 1993). We would expect similar benefits from teaching members of organizations about the CPR Model.

Step 1: Increasing the Detection of Discrimination First, diversity education should provide information about the frequency of discrimination, the forms it might take, and the variety of groups that it affects. In particular, people should be made aware that prejudice today is far less overt than in the past. For example, survey data reveal a decreasing trend in Whites' self-reported hostility toward Blacks since the Civil Rights Movement (e.g.,
Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), yet the majority of Whites—even those who consciously disavow prejudice—exhibit implicit anti-Black bias (e.g., Monteith et al., 2001). Such biases predict subtle, often nonverbal discriminatory reactions to targets. For example, to the extent that Whites exhibit implicit anti-Black biases, they engage in more avoidance behaviors (e.g., less speaking time, more speech hesitations) toward Blacks (McConnell & Liebold, 2001) and are perceived by Blacks as more prejudiced (Richeson & Shelton, 2005). In fact, a recent meta-analysis revealed that, in the domain of intergroup relations, implicit attitude measures had better predictive validity than explicit, self-report measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, in press). These findings underscore the need for diversity educators to inform people about the existence of implicit biases and their implications for organizational outcomes.

One successful strategy for increasing awareness of subtle forms of prejudice is giving people the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), a computer reaction-time task that assesses the ease with which people associate different stimuli (e.g., Whites, Blacks) with pleasant versus unpleasant exemplars. For example, in the racial IAT, people who respond faster when Black and unpleasant and White and pleasant are paired than when they do when the reverse pairings occur exhibit an implicit preference for Whites relative to Blacks. Although the IAT assesses automatic prejudice, many people recognize their difficulty responding for some trials relative to others, and to the extent that they attribute their difficulty to prejudice, they experience negative self-directed affect that is important for reducing future bias (Monteith et al., 2001). Taking the IAT and receiving feedback regarding their level of bias increases people’s openness to the possibility that they may have biases of which they are not aware (Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Lemoine, 2008; Morris & Ashburn-Nardo, 2008). To the extent that people feel guilty as a result, they are more likely to avoid biased responding in subsequent situations (Monteith et al., 2002). The IAT is available via the Internet (see http://implicit.harvard.edu/), so organizations can easily include it in their diversity curriculum.

In addition, diversity educators might share with organizations empirical findings regarding targets’ perceptions of nontargets who make superficially positive remarks about stigmatized groups. For example, Czopp (2008) asked Black participants to watch video clips in which a White actor supposedly interviewing for a task force on diversity either made a reference to Blacks’ athletic prowess or made no such remark. Participants who witnessed the use of positive stereotypes rated the actor as more prejudiced, less likeable, and less qualified for the position. By educating people about the subtle nature of social bias in today’s world, they will be better prepared to detect discrimination.

Step 2: Helping People Understand the Gravity of Discrimination

Not only do people need to be able to recognize discrimination, but they should also be made aware of its short- and long-term consequences. For example, in one recent study, racial variables including perceived discrimination accounted for as much variance in African Americans’ psychological well-being and distress as is typically documented in studies examining variables like job security and social support in the general population (Ashburn-Nardo, Monteith, Arthur, & Boin, 2007). Teaching members of organizations that discrimination causes as much stress for targets as these more commonplace concerns may help them recognize it as an emergency, perhaps especially when bias is in the form of microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007); microinequities (Haslett & Lipman, 1997); or daily hassles (Swim et al., 2001, 2003) that may seem relatively harmless but nonetheless are demeaning and injurious.

To help people understand that discrimination threatens targets’ integrity, reputation, and esteem, diversity educators could utilize a paradigm from the social ostracism literature. Williams and colleagues (see Williams & Jarvis, 2006) developed Cyberball, a virtual ball-tossing game, to examine the effects of social acceptance versus exclusion. In Cyberball, participants are led to believe that they are interacting with at least two other people via the Internet. Participants have the opportunity to “throw” the ball to and to “catch” the ball from other players. In reality, the other players do not exist; rather, the experimenter programs the game such that participants are eventually ignored by the other players, who toss the ball to each other but not to the participant. Participants who are ostracized in such games experience negative affect, feelings of helplessness or lack of control, and a sense that they do not belong (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000)—reactions often reported by stigmatized targets in actual encounters with discrimination (Feagin, 1991). Experiencing the affective consequences of stigma through such an exercise may be especially useful for nontargets, who may have difficulty understanding the urgent nature of discrimination, given their relative lack of firsthand knowledge.
Step 3: Increasing Perceptions of Responsibility

Although it may be difficult to control how many people are present when a discriminatory incident happens, some strategies will likely increase individual perceptions of responsibility to confront. Nontargets should especially benefit from learning that they have an important role in reducing others' prejudice. Research suggests that nontargets are particularly effective when they confront perpetrators indirectly, such as when they write newspaper editorials that implicate the reader as part of the problem of (and solution to) discrimination. People perceive nontargets as more persuasive than targets in such circumstances because targets are perceived as simply complaining (Mark & Monteith, 2005; Mark, Monteith, & Oaks, 2007). These findings not only suggest that diversity education may be more effectively conducted by nontargets, but they also demonstrate that, in the right conditions, anyone can potentially be an effective confronter regardless of group membership.

One strategy for increasing perceived responsibility for prejudice confrontation is to establish it formally as part of employees' work role (see Treviño & Victor, 1992). At the organizational level, this could involve clear messages that discrimination is taken seriously (see Hulin, Fitzgerald, & Drasgow, 1996). At a more personal level, organizations could ask members to accept "focused responsibility" to act whenever discrimination— as opposed to more diffuse acts of incivility— occurs. Research suggests that such behavior-specific responsibility increases the likelihood of intervention (Shaffer, Rogel, & Hendrick, 1975).

Steps 4 and 5: Teaching People How to Confront and Practicing Confrontation

Given that people often have little practical socialization in responding to discrimination, behavior modeling training (BMT) may be important for developing experience and expertise. BMT is a highly effective social learning approach to training that involves describing specific skills to be learned, providing models of those skills, and giving trainees opportunities to practice under circumstances that are likely to transfer to other contexts (for a review, see Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Chan, 2005). Thus, BMT applies directly to Step 4 (Deciding How to Confront) and Step 5 (Taking Action) of the CPR Model.

Recent research underscores the importance of behavior modeling in increasing the likelihood of confrontation. In a study by Czopp (2007), participants watched videos of a person telling offensive jokes (one of which was racist) to another person, who subsequently confronted (or did not confront) the joke teller. In the confrontation conditions, half the participants witnessed an apologetic reaction from the joke teller whereas half witnessed a hostile reaction. Participants later encountered a confederate who expressed liking for the videotaped jokes and told a racist joke of his own. Participants who had witnessed a successful confrontation (i.e., that resulted in an apology) were significantly more likely to confront the confederate than those who witnessed an unsuccessful confrontation or no confrontation.

BMT-like strategies have also been used to educate college students about confrontation. Plous (2000) described a role-playing exercise in which students assumed the roles of speaker, responder, and coach. Drawing from student diaries, Plous presented students with real-life examples of witnessed prejudiced responses and asked them to reenact the examples with the benefit of a coach who provided suggestions for how to minimize backlash that might result from confrontation. For example, framing confrontation in the form of a question (e.g., Do you feel that way about the entire group or just one individual?); invoking the perpetrator's egalitarian self-concept (e.g., I always thought of you as open-minded); focusing on how the perpetrator's actions made observers feel (e.g., I'm uncomfortable when you say things like that); and avoiding self-righteousness (e.g., With all the stereotypes we encounter, I can see how you might say that, but we should all try harder to avoid thinking that way) were strategies that students generated to confront discrimination in ways that were unlikely to result in backlash and anger. Students reported learning a lot about prejudice from the classroom exercise and considered it a valuable experience.

Collectively, the findings of Plous (2000) and Czopp (2007) underscore the utility of witnessing and practicing successful confrontations. Giving people opportunities to practice confrontation should increase perceptions of efficacy and behavioral intentions to confront, thereby making actual confrontation more likely when discriminatory incidents occur. Moreover, to reduce the perceived costs of confrontation, organizations could offer members the assurance of protection for reporting discrimination to authorities even if they choose not to confront the perpetrator directly.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CPR MODEL

The CPR Model offers several advantages over many contemporary approaches to diversity edu-
cation. First, in contrast to recent criticisms of diversity training (e.g., Paluck, 2006), the CPR Model is solidly grounded in theory. Although empirical support for the efficacy of confrontation is relatively recent in the social–psychological literature, confrontation research draws from over 50 years of prejudice reduction theory, dating back at least to Allport (1954). Furthermore, confrontation research to date is experimental in nature, thereby addressing the frequent methodological criticisms of diversity research (for a review, see Pendry, Driscoll, & Field, 2007).

Confrontation is not accompanied by many of the challenges met by other prejudice reduction techniques. For example, although intergroup contact (Allport, 1954) has demonstrated success in improving relationships and reducing prejudiced attitudes (for a review, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), its requisite conditions are difficult to meet in the real world. To maximize effectiveness, contact must be sustained over time and in a variety of circumstances that create potential for friendship. Similarly, self-regulatory strategies (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) are predicated on the assumption that people recognize their own biased responses when they occur, and such strategies work primarily for people who are internally motivated to avoid prejudice. Indeed, without confrontation, self-regulatory processes are often not initiated (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Confrontation circumvents these problems: people anywhere can use it as a way of reducing others’ prejudice or announcing their own victimization. Although confrontation is certainly not an intergroup relations panacea, it is, under many circumstances, a viable, available option that people may not consider until they are shown how.

Given that the expression of prejudice often occurs automatically, with little intent (for a review, see Blair, 2001), it may be surprising that we discuss confrontation via a step model, thereby suggesting a more controlled process. Some may see the CPR Model as limited in this regard. As noted earlier, we acknowledge the possibility that people may confront automatically and with little deliberation, perhaps especially in emotionally charged circumstances. However, our review of the literature suggests that confrontation is often more thoughtful, with the social and emotional costs of confronting weighing heavily on the minds of potential confronters. This may particularly be the case within the hierarchy of an organization where people may be especially reticent to confront those in power. Despite being bothered or offended by discrimination, people rarely say or do as much as they (think they) would like (Nielsen & Nelson, 2005; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), thus highlighting the need for additional research examining whether and when people will confront.

CONCLUSION

We have described a model for understanding factors that promote versus inhibit the confrontation of discrimination, with special attention to its implementation in diversity education. Armed with knowledge of “CPR,” we suspect that many people who disapprove of prejudice and discrimination will seek to improve their organizational environment by educating perpetrators and empowering victims through confrontation. Their courageous actions will help to establish and maintain an inclusive and supportive climate for all.

REFERENCES


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